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 1I n t r o d u c t i o n
A long standing challenge in macroeconomics is accounting for the relatively smooth behavior of real
wages over the business cycle along with the relatively volatile behavior of employment. A recent
body of research, beginning with Shimer (2005a), Hall (2005a) and Costain and Reiter (2003), has
re-ignited interest in addressing this challenge. These authors show that the conventional model of
unemployment dynamics due to Mortensen and Pissarides (hereafter “MP”) cannot account for the
key cyclical movements in labor market activity, at least for standard calibrations of parameters.
The basic problem is that the mechanism for wage determination within this framework, period-
by-period Nash bargaining between ﬁrms and workers, induces too much volatility in wages. This
exaggerated procyclical movement in wages, in turn, dampens the cyclical movement in ﬁrms’
incentives to hire. Shimer (2004) and Hall (2005a) proceed to show that with the introduction of
ad hoc wage stickiness, the framework can account for employment volatility. Of course, this begs
the question of what are the primitive forces that might underlie this wage rigidity.
A rapidly growing literature has emerged to take on this puzzle. Much of this work attempts to
provide an axiomatic foundation for wage rigidity, explicitly building up from assumptions about
the information structure, and so on.1 To date, due to complexity, this work has focused mainly
on qualitative ﬁndings and has addressed quantitative issues only in a limited way.2
In this paper we take a pragmatic approach to modelling wage rigidity, with the aim of develop-
ing a framework that is tractable for quantitative analysis. In particular, we retain the empirically
appealing feature of Nash bargaining, but modify the conventional MP model to allow for stag-
gered multi-period wage contracting. Each period, only a subset of ﬁrms and workers negotiate a
wage contract. Each wage bargain, further, is between a ﬁrm and its existing workforce: Workers
hired in-between contract settlements receive the existing wage. We restrict the form of the wage
contract to call for a ﬁxed wage per period over an exogenously given horizon. Though it would
be undoubtedly preferable to completely endogenize the contract structure, these restrictions are
reasonable from an empirical standpoint. The payoﬀ is a simple empirically appealing wage equa-
tion that is an intuitive generalization of the standard Nash bargaining outcome. The gain over a
simple ad hoc wage adjustment mechanism is that the key primitive parameter of the model is the
average frequency of wage adjustment, as opposed to an arbitrary partial adjustment coeﬃcient
in a wage equation. In this way, the staggered contracting structure provides more discipline in
evaluating the model than do simple ad hoc adjustment mechanisms.
1Examples include Menzio (2005), Kennan (2006) and Shimer and Wright (2004). Others have explored ﬂexible
wage alternatives: e.g. Hagedorn and Manovski (2006), Mortensen and Nagypal (2006), and Rotemberg (2006). See
Hall (2005c) for a survey.
2An exception is Menzio (2005) who presents a calibrated model with endogenous wage rigidity. His model does
well except for wages, which are too smooth. We instead focus on explaining the joint dynamics of labor market
activity and wages.
2The use of time dependent staggered price and wage setting, of course, is widespread in macro-
economic modelling, beginning with Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983). More recently, Christiano,
Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2003) have found that staggered wage con-
tracting is critical to the empirical performance of the recent vintage of dynamic general equilibrium
macroeconomic frameworks (i.e., sticky prices alone are not suﬃcient). There are, however, some
important distinguishing features of our approach. First, macroeconomic models with staggered
wage setting typically have employment adjusting along the intensive margin. That is, wage stick-
iness enhances ﬂuctuations in hours worked as opposed to total employment. As a consequence,
these frameworks are susceptible to Barro’s (1977) argument that wages may not be allocational
in this kind of environment, given that ﬁrm’s and workers have an on-going relationship. If wages
are not allocational, of course, then wage rigidity does not inﬂuence model dynamics. By contrast,
in the model we present, wages aﬀect employment at the extensive margin: They inﬂuence the rate
at which ﬁrms add new workers to their respective labor forces. As emphasized by Hall (2005a), in
this kind of setting the Barro critique does not apply.
As e c o n dk e yd i ﬀerence involves the nature of the wage contracting process. In the conventional
macroeconomic models, monopolistically competitive workers set wages. Here, ﬁrms and workers
bargain over wages in a setting with search and matching frictions. As a consequence, some inter-
esting “spillover” eﬀects emerge of the average market wage on the contract wage. These spillover
eﬀects are a product of the staggered contract/bargaining environment. They introduce additional
stickiness in the movement of real wages, much the same way that real rigidities enhance nominal
price stickiness in models of staggered price setting (e.g., Kimball, 1995, and Woodford, 2003).
As we noted, the wage/unemployment volatility puzzle arises with standard calibrations of the
MP model. An interesting recent paper by Hagedorn and Manovskii (HM, 2006) considers an
alternative parameterization. In particular, these authors ﬁnd parameters that allow the model to
match the low elasticity of wages with respect to productivity present in the data. By generating
smooth wages in this fashion, the model is then able to capture unemployment volatility. At
issue, however, is that some of the key parameters required to permit the model to capture the
volatility puzzle are quite diﬀerent than conventional analyses suggest may be reasonable. In eﬀect,
HM make labor supply high elastic, much more so than do standard calibrations. In addition,
despite calibrating to match wage data, their model does not account well for either the cyclical
co-movement or volatility of wages, as we discuss below.
We diﬀer by using a more conventional model parametrization. In our framework, accordingly,
it is the overlapping multi-period wage contracts that accounts for the low elasticity of wages with
respect to productivity. Further, rather than picking parameters to match this elasticity, we choose
them to be consistent with the available micro evidence on the duration of wage adjustments. In
this regard, we add a degree of discipline on the calibration. We then investigate how well the model
captures wage dynamics, as well as the volatility of unemployment and the other key variables of
the model.
3In section 2 we characterize the basic features of the model. In section 3 we derive a set of simple
dynamic equations for wages and the hiring rate, obtained by considering a local approximation
of the model about the steady state. We also exposit the spillover eﬀects that inﬂuence the wage
bargaining process, contributing to overall wage stickiness. One additional distinguishing feature
of the setup is that a “horizon eﬀect” emerges that inﬂuences the bargaining process, since ﬁrms
care about the implications of the contract wage for future hires, while workers do not. While the
horizon eﬀect is interesting from a theoretical perspective, it turns out to not be quantitatively
important in our baseline calibration. In sectio n4w ee x a m i n et h ee m p i r i c a lp e r f o r m a n c eo ft h e
model and show that the framework does a good job of accounting for the basic features of the
U.S. data, including wage dynamics. In section 5, we verify that under our calibration the model
satisﬁes the important technical condition that the wage always lies within the bargaining set over
the life of the contract. Concluding remarks are in section 6. Finally, the appendix provides an
explicit derivation of all the key results, including the steady state of the model. It also presents
the complete loglinearized model.
2 The Model
The framework is a variation of the Mortensen and Pissarides search and matching model (Mortensen
and Pissarides, 1994, Pissarides, 2000). The main diﬀerence is that we allow for staggered multi-
period wage contracting. Within the standard framework, workers and ﬁrms negotiate wages based
on period-by-period Nash bargaining. We keep the Nash bargaining framework, but in the spirit
of Taylor (1980) and Calvo (1983), only a fraction of ﬁr m sa n dw o r k e r sr e - s e tw a g e si na n yg i v e n
period. As well, they strike a bargain that lasts for multiple periods. Workers hired in between
contracting periods receive the existing contract wage. Here the idea is that due to scale economies
in bargaining, employment terms are negotiated only periodically: Firms do not negotiate separate
terms for the relatively small percentage of workers who enter in-between contracting periods.3 In-
deed, Bewley (1999) presents some evidence consistent with this scenario: In particular, he shows
that wages of new workers are often linked to the existing internal pay structure.4
For technical reasons, there are two other diﬀerences from MP. First, because it will turn out
to be important for us to distinguish between existing and newly hired workers at a ﬁrm, we drop
the assumption of one worker per ﬁrm and instead allow ﬁrms to hire a continuum of workers. We
assume constant returns to scale, however, which greatly simpliﬁes the bargaining problem. Second,
we drop the conventional assumption of a ﬁxed cost per vacancy opened and instead assume that
ﬁrms face quadratic adjustment costs of adjusting employment size. The reason is as follows: With
3Our scenario applies to situations where workers are relatively homogenous: e.g. clerical workers as opposed to
professional basketball players.
4Bewley (1999) argues that internal equity considerations constrain workers of similar productivity to receive
similar wages, consistent with the hypothesis that new workers receive the existing contract wage.
4staggered wage setting, there will arise a dispersion of wages across ﬁrms in equilibrium. Quadratic
costs of adjusting employment ensures a determinate equilibrium in the presence of wage dispersion.
To be clear, however, while this assumption is necessary for technical reasons, it does not drive our
results, as we show below.
Finally, we embed our search and matching framework within a simple intertemporal general
equilibrium framework in order to study the dynamics of unemployment and wages. Following
Merz (1995) and others, we adopt the representative family construct, which eﬀectively involves
introducing complete consumption insurance.
2.1 Unemployment, Vacancies and Matching
Let us now be more precise about the details: There is a continuum of inﬁnitely lived workers
and a continuum of inﬁnitely lived ﬁrms, each of measure one. We index ﬁrms by i and workers
according to the identity of their employer. Each ﬁrm i employs nt(i) workers at time t. It also
posts vt(i) vacancies in order to attract new workers for the next period of operation. The total
number of vacancies and employed workers are vt =
R 1
0 vt(i)di and nt =
R 1
0 nt(i)di. The total number
of unemployed workers, ut, is given by
ut =1− nt. (1)
Following convention, we assume that the number of new hires or “matches”, mt, is a function
of unemployed workers and vacancies, as follows:
mt = σmuσ
t v1−σ
t . (2)
The probability a ﬁrm ﬁl l sav a c a n c yi np e r i o dt, qt,i sg i v e nb y
qt =
mt
vt
. (3)
Similarly, the probability an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job, st,i sg i v e nb y
st =
mt
ut
. (4)
Both ﬁrms and workers take qt and st as given.
Finally, each ﬁrm exogenously separates from a fraction 1−ρ of its workers each period, where
ρ is the probability a worker “survives” with the ﬁrm until the next period. Accordingly, within our
framework ﬂuctuations in unemployment will be due to cyclical variation in hiring as opposed to
separations. Both Hall (2005b,c) and Shimer (2005a,b) argue that this characterization is consistent
with recent U.S. evidence.
52.2 Firms
Each period, ﬁrms produce output, yt (i), using capital, kt (i), and labor, nt (i), a c c o r d i n gt ot h e
following Cobb-Douglas technology:
yt (i)=atkt (i)
α nt (i)
1−α , (5)
where at is a common productivity factor. As we noted earlier, because we will have wage dispersion
across ﬁrms, we replace the standard assumption of ﬁxed costs of posting a vacancy with quadratic
labor adjustment costs. For simplicity, we assume capital is perfectly mobile across ﬁrms and that
there is a competitive rental market in capital.
It is convenient to deﬁne the hiring rate, xt (i), as the ratio of new hires, qtvt (i), to the existing
workforce, nt (i):
xt (i)=
qtvt (i)
nt (i)
. (6)
Note that the ﬁrm knows the hiring rate with certainty at time t, since it knows that likelihood qt
that each vacancy it posts will be ﬁlled. The total workforce, in turn, is the sum of the number of
surviving workers, ρnt (i), and new hires, qtvt (i):
nt+1 (i)=ρnt (i)+qtvt (i). (7)
Let wt (i) be the the wage rate, zt the rental rate of capital, and βEtΛt,t+1 be the ﬁrm’s
discount rate, where the parameter β is the household’s subjective discount factor and where
Λt,t+1 = u0(ct+1)/u0(ct). Then given quadratic costs of adjusting the workforce, the value of the
ﬁrm Ft (i), may be expressed as:
Ft (i)=yt (i) − wt (i)nt (i) −
κ
2
xt (i)
2 nt (i) − ztkt (i)+βEtΛt,t+1Ft+1 (i). (8)
At any time, the ﬁrm maximizes its value by choosing the hiring rate (by posting vacancies)
and its capital stock, given its existing employment stock, the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy, the
rental rate on capital and the current and expected path of wages. If it is a ﬁrm that is able to
renegotiate the wage, it bargains with its workforce over a new contract. If it is not renegotiating, it
takes as given the wage at the previous period’s level, as well the likelihood it will be renegotiating
in the future.
We next consider the ﬁrm’s hiring and capital rental decisions, and defer a bit the description
of the wage bargain. Let Jt (i) be the value to the ﬁrm of adding another worker at time t:
Jt (i)=( 1− α)
yt (i)
nt (i)
− wt (i)+
κ
2
xt (i)
2 + ρβEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 (i). (9)
Then the ﬁrst order condition for vacancy posting equates the marginal cost of adding a worker
with the discounted marginal beneﬁt:
6κxt (i)=βEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 (i). (10)
In turn, the ﬁrst order condition for capital is simply:
zt = α
yt (i)
kt (i)
= α
yt
kt
. (11)
With Cobb-Douglas production and perfectly mobile capital, output/capital ratios are equalized
across ﬁrms. It follows that capital/labor ratios and output/labor ratios are also equalized.
Let fnt denote the ﬁrm’s marginal product of labor at t (i.e., fnt =( 1− α)yt/nt). Then,
combining equations yields the following forward looking diﬀerence equation for the hiring rate:
κxt (i)=βEtΛt,t+1
h
fnt+1 − wt+1 (i)+
κ
2
xt+1 (i)
2 + ρκxt+1 (i)
i
. (12)
The hiring rate thus depends on a discounted stream of the ﬁrm’s expected future surplus from the
marginal worker: the sum of net earnings at the margin, fnt+1−wt+1 (i), and saving on adjustment
costs, κ
2xt+1 (i)
2 .
2.3 Workers
I nt h i ss u b - s e c t i o nw ed e v e l o pa ne x p r e s s i o nf o raw orker’s surplus from employment, which becomes
a critical determinant of the outcome of the wage bargain.
Let Vt (i) be the value to a worker of employment at ﬁrm i and let Ut be the value of unem-
ployment. Vt (i) is given by
Vt (i)=wt (i)+βEtΛt,t+1 [ρVt+1 (i)+( 1− ρ)Ut+1]. (13)
Note that this value depends on the wage speciﬁct oﬁrm i, wt (i), as well as the likelihood the
worker will remain employed in the subsequent period.
To construct the value of unemployment, we ﬁrst deﬁne Vx,t as the average value of employment
conditional on being a new worker at t. The subscript x is meant to denote that we are averaging
Vt (i) across new workers, i.e., workers at t who were hired in period t − 1. Vx,t is given by
Vx,t =
Z 1
0
Vt (i)
xt−1(i)nt−1(i)
xt−1nt−1
di, (14)
where xt−1(i)nt−1(i) is total new workers at ﬁrm i at time t (i.e., hires from the previous period)
and xt−1nt−1 is total new workers at t.5 Next, let b be the ﬂow value from unemployment, taken
to be unemployment beneﬁts. Then, Ut may be expressed as
5Vx,t is thus distinct from the unconditional average value of employment Vt =
U 1
0 Vt (i)
nt(i)
nt di. However, since in
the steady state hiring rates are identical across ﬁrms and employment shares are constant, Vx,t and Vt are identical in
the steady state and have similar dynamics outside the steady state, up to a ﬁrst order approximation. The appendix
elaborates.
7Ut = b + βEtΛt,t+1 [stVx,t+1 +( 1− st)Ut+1], (15)
where, as before, st is the probability of ﬁnding a job for the subsequent period. The value of
unemployment thus depends on the current ﬂow value b and the likelihood of being employed
versus unemployed next period. Note that the value of ﬁnding a job next period for a worker that
is currently unemployed is Vx,t+1, the average value of working next period conditional on being a
new worker. That is, unemployed workers do not have a priori knowledge of which ﬁrms might be
paying higher wages next period. They instead just randomly ﬂock to ﬁrms posting vacancies.6
The worker surplus at ﬁrm i, Ht (i), and the average worker surplus conditional on being a new
hire, Hx,t,a r eg i v e nb y :
Ht (i)=Vt (i) − Ut, (16)
and
Hx,t = Vx,t − Ut. (17)
It follows that:
Ht (i)=wt (i) − b + βEtΛt,t+1 [ρHt+1 (i) − stHx,t+1]. (18)
2.4 Consumption and Saving
Following Merz (1995) and others, we use the representative family construct, which gives rise to
perfect consumption insurance. In particular, the family has employed workers at all ﬁrms and
unemployed workers, representative of the population at large. The family pools their incomes
before choosing per capita consumption and asset holdings. In addition to wage income and un-
employment income, the family has a diversiﬁed ownership stake in ﬁrms, which pay out proﬁts
Πt. Finally, households may either consume ct, or save in the form of capital, which they rent
to ﬁrms at the rate zt. Let Ωt be the value function for the representative household. Then the
maximization problem may be expressed as
Ωt =m a x
{ct,kt+1}
[log(ct)+βEtΩt+1] (19)
subject to
ct + kt+1 = wtnt +( 1− nt)b +( zt +1− δ)kt + Πt + Tt, (20)
6There is accordingly no directed search. Note, however, that wage diﬀerentials across ﬁrms are only due to the
diﬀerential timing of contracts, which is transitory. Thus, because a worker who arrives at a ﬁrm in the midst of an
existing contract may expect a new one reasonably soon, the payoﬀ from directed search may not be large.
8where Tt are transfers from the government.7
Let λt ≡ c−1
t be the marginal utility of consumption. Then the ﬁrst order necessary condition
for consumption/saving yields:
λt = βEtλt+1 (zt+1 +1− δ). (21)
2.5 Nash Bargaining and Wage Dynamics
We restrict the form of the wage contract to call for a ﬁxed wage per period over an exogenously
given length of time. Though it would be undoubtedly preferable to completely endogenize the
contract structure, these restrictions are reasonable from an empirical standpoint. The payoﬀ will
be a simple empirically appealing wage equation that is an intuitive generalization of the standard
Nash bargaining outcome. In particular, given these restrictions on the form of the contract, workers
and ﬁrms determine the contract wage through Nash bargaining.
We introduce staggered multiperiod wage contracting in a way that simpliﬁes aggregation. In
particular, each period a ﬁrm has a ﬁxed probability 1 − λ that it may re-negotiate the wage.
This adjustment probability is independent of its history. Thus, while how long an individual wage
contract lasts is uncertain, the average duration is ﬁxed at 1/(1 − λ). The coeﬃcient λ is thus a
measure of the degree of wage stickiness that can be calibrated to match the data.8 This simple
Poisson adjustment process, further, implies that it is not necessary to keep track of individual
ﬁrms’ wage histories, which makes aggregation simple. In the end, the model will deliver a simple
relation for the evolution of wages that is the product of Nash bargaining in conjunction with
staggered wage setting.
Firms that enter a new wage agreement at t negotiate with the existing workforce, including
the recent new hires. Due to constant returns, all workers are the same at the margin. The wage
is chosen so that the negotiating ﬁrm and the marginal worker share the surplus from the marginal
match. Given the symmetry to which we just alluded, all workers employed at the ﬁrm receive
the same newly-negotiated wage.9 When ﬁrms are not allowed to renegotiate the wage, all existing
and newly hired workers employed at the ﬁrm receive the wage paid the previous period.10 As we
discussed earlier, we appeal to scale economies in bargaining to rule out separate negotiations for
7The government simply collects lump-sum taxes (negative transfers) and uses them to pay unemployment beneﬁts.
8This kind of Poisson adjustment process is widely used in macroeconomic models with staggered price setting,
beginning with Calvo (1983).
9To be clear, with constant returns, one could either think of the ﬁrm bargaining with each marginal worker
individually or bargaining with a union that wishes to maximixe average worker surplus.
10The only research we are aware of that studies the relation between the wages of existing employees and new
hires is Bewley (1999), who ﬁnds such a link. Other studies of the cyclical behavior of wages for new hires (e.g.
Bils, 1985) do not examine the link with existing workers wages (due to data limitations) and thus do not speak to
our hypothesis. We think that explaining the facts in these studies will require introducing heterogeneity into our
framework.
9worker who arrive in between contracting periods.11 Of course, the newly hired workers recognize
that they will be able to re-negotiate wage at the next round of contracting. In the benchmark
case where the contract length corresponds to just one period, wage dynamics are just as in the
conventional model and behave counterfactually as recently argued.
Let w∗
t denote the wage of a ﬁrm that renegotiates at t. Given constant returns, all sets of
renegotiating ﬁrms and workers at time t face the same problem, and thus set the same wage. As
we noted earlier, the ﬁrm negotiates with the marginal worker over the surplus from the marginal
match. We assume Nash bargaining, which implies that the contract wage w∗
t is chosen to solve
maxHt (r)
η Jt (r)
1−η , (22)
where Ht (r) and Jt (r) are the values of J and H for renegotiating workers and ﬁrms.
Because the contract is multi-period, we need to take into account the impact of the contract
wage on the expected future path of ﬁrm and worker surplus. Let W
f
t (r) denote the ﬁrm’s dis-
counted sum of expected future wage payments over both the existing contract and subsequent
contracts and let Wh
t (r) be the corresponding value of the worker’s expected wage receipts. Note
that the two values will diﬀer in general because the ﬁrm has a longer horizon than the worker:
The ﬁrm cares about the impact of the current wage contract on payments not only to the existing
workforce, but also to new workers who enter under the terms of the existing contract. A worker,
on the other hand, only cares about wages during his or her tenure at the ﬁrm. Accordingly, let
Σt (r) be the ﬁrm’s cumulative discount factor and ∆t the worker’s cumulative discount factor.
Then:
W
f
t (r)=Σt (r)w∗
t +( 1− λ)Et
∞ P
s=1
nt+s
nt
(r)βsΛt,t+sΣt+s(r)w∗
t+s, (23)
Ww
t (r)=∆tw∗
t +( 1− λ)Et
∞ P
s=1
(ρβ)
s Λt,t+s∆t+sw∗
t+s, (24)
with
Σt (r)=Et
∞ P
s=0
nt+s
nt
(r)(λβ)
s Λt,t+s, (25)
∆t = Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρλβ)
s Λt,t+s. (26)
Observe that each term s in the ﬁrm’s cumulative discount factor depends on the expectation of
the product of three factors: the employment size at ﬁrm t + s relative to time t,
nt+s
nt (r), the
11In addition to scale economies in bargaining, there are several complementary justiﬁcations for why hires in
between contracts receive the existing contract wage. First, as we noted earlier, Bewley (1999) argues that internal
equity constrains workers of similar productivity to receive similar wages. Second, Menzio and Moen (2006) show
how asymmetric information can link the wages of new and existing workers. Third, consistent with Hall (2005a),
one might interpret the existing contract wage as the “wage norm” for workers hired in between contracts.
10probability the contract survives to t + s, λs, and the households’ discount factor, βsΛt,t+s. It is
similar for the worker, except the survival probability ρs replaces the relative employment size.
Since on average
nt+s
nt (r) exceeds ρs,t h eﬁrm places relatively more weight on the future than does
the worker. This simply reﬂects that, unlike the worker, the ﬁrm cares about the implications of
the contract for new workers as well as existing ones.
The appendix shows that for renegotiating ﬁrms and workers we can write
Jt (r)=Et
∞ P
s=0
nt+s
nt
(r)βsΛt,t+s
h
fnt+s −
κ
2
xt+s (r)
2
i
− W
f
t (r), (27)
and
Ht (r)=Ww
t (r) − Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρβ)
s Λt,t+s [b + st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Hx,t+s+1]. (28)
Equation (27) is obtained by combining the hiring rate condition with the expression for the shadow
value of a worker to the ﬁrm Jt(r) given by equation (9). Intuitively, given constant returns and
given the hiring rate is chosen optimally, the surplus of the marginal worker at t may be expressed
as discounted proﬁt sp e rw o r k e ra tt, where the term
nt+s
nt (r) enters the discount factor to adjust
for relative changes in ﬁrm size in the future. In turn, the marginal worker’s surplus, Ht (r),
depends on the expected discounted value of wage payments, net the discounted sum of ﬂow value of
unemployment, b, plus expected discounted surplus of moving from unemployment to employment,
st+sβΛt,t+s+1Hx,t+s+1.
The solution to the Nash bargaining problem, then, is
η∆tJt (r)=( 1− η)Σt (r)Ht (r), (29)
where ∆t = ∂Ht (r)/∂w∗
t is the eﬀect of a rise in the contract wage on worker surplus, while
Σt (r)=−∂Jt (r)/∂w∗
t is minus the eﬀect of a rise in the contract wage on ﬁrm surplus. Since on
average Σt (r) > ∆t, shifts in the contract wage have a larger impact in absolute value on ﬁrms
surplus than on worker surplus. This contrasts with the conventional case of period-by-period
bargaining, where the two eﬀects are of identical absolute values (since the future is irrelevant in
this case.)
It is possible to rewrite equation (29) as
χt (r)Jt (r)=( 1− χt (r))Ht (r), (30)
with
χt (r)=
η
η +( 1− η)Σt (r)/∆t
. (31)
Equation (31) is a variation on the conventional sharing rule, where the relative weight χt (r)
depends not only on the worker’s bargaining power η,b u ta l s oo nt h ed i ﬀerential ﬁrm/worker
horizon, reﬂected by the term Σt (r)/∆t. Note that in the limiting case of λ =0 , Σt (r)/∆t =1
and χt (r)=η, as in the conventional case of period-by-period wage bargaining. With λ>0,
11however, χt (r) is less than η on average (since Σt (r)/∆t exceeds unity on average). Intuitively,
since movements in the contract wage have a larger impact on discounted ﬁrm surplus than on
worker surplus, the “horizon eﬀect” works to raise the eﬀective bargaining power of ﬁrms from
1 − η to 1 − χt (r).12
As the appendix shows, combining equations yields the following ﬁrst order forward looking
diﬀerence equation for the contract wage:
∆tw∗
t = wo
t (r)+ρλβEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w∗
t+1, (32)
where the forcing variable wo
t (r) can be thought of as the “target” wage and is given by
wo
t (r)=χt (r)
³
fnt +
κ
2
xt (r)
2
´
+( 1− χt (r))(b + stβEtΛt,t+1Hx,t+1). (33)
Observe that the target wage has the same form as the wage that would emerge under period-by-
period Nash bargaining, though with an adjustment for the horizon eﬀect. In particular, it is a
convex combination of what a worker contributes to the match and what the worker loses by ac-
cepting a job, where the weights depend on the worker’s relative horizon-adjusted bargaining power
χt (r). The worker’s contribution is the marginal product of labor plus the saving on adjustment
costs. With our quadratic cost formulation, this saving is measured by κ
2xt (r)
2. The foregone ben-
eﬁt from unemployment, in turn, is the ﬂow value of unemployment, b, plus expected discounted
gain of moving from unemployment this period to employment next period, stβΛt,t+1Hx,t+1.
As in the conventional literature on time-dependent wage and price contracting (Taylor, 1980
and Calvo, 1983), the contract wage depends on an expected discounted sum of the target under
perfectly ﬂexible adjustment, in this case wo
t (r). Iterating equation (32) yields
w∗
t = Et
∞ P
s=0
φt,t+swo
t+s (r) (34)
with
φt,t+s =
(ρλβ)
s Λt,t+s
Et
P∞
s=0 (ρλβ)
s Λt,t+s
(35)
Observe that in the limiting case of period by period wage negotiations, i.e., when λ =0 , w∗
t
converges to wo
t (r).
As i g n i ﬁcant diﬀerence from the traditional literature on wage contracting, however, is that
spillover eﬀects emerge directly from the bargaining problem that have the contract wage depend
positively on the economy-wide average wage. As we show in section 3, these spillover eﬀects emerge
because the average wage aﬀects the two key determinants of the target wage, wo
t (r): the expected
discounted surplus of moving from unemployment to employment, stβΛt,t+1Hx,t+1, and the hiring
rate, xt (r). Through both these channels, the spillover works to enhance wage rigidity.
12We thank Larry Christiano for pointing out to us that in an earlier version of the paper we had not properly
taken into account the impact of the “horizon eﬀect” on the bargaining problem.
12Finally, the average wage across workers is given by
wt =
Z 1
0
wt(i)
nt(i)
nt
di (36)
Since the fraction of ﬁrms that re-negotiate contracts is a random draw across the population and
since all ﬁrms that renegotiate at t choose the same contract wage w∗
t, by the law of large numbers
w ec a ne x p r e s st h ew a g ei n d e xa s
wt =( 1− λ)w∗
t + λ
Z 1
0
wt−1(i)
nt(i)
nt
di (37)
where 1 − λ is the fraction of ﬁrms who are re-negotiating and λ is the fraction who are not. The
average wage is thus a convex combination of the contract wage, w∗
t, and the average wage across
the population of ﬁrms that do not re-negotiate, given by the integral in the second term. As we
show below, up to a ﬁrst order, this integral can be approximated by last period’s average wage,
wt−1.13
2.6 Resource Constraint
We complete the model with the following resource constraint, which divides output between con-
sumption, investment and adjustment costs:
yt = ct + kt+1 − (1 − δ)kt +
κ
2
Z 1
0
xt(i)2nt(i)di. (38)
This completes the description of the model.
3 Wage/Hiring Dynamics and Spillover Eﬀects
To gain some intuition for the model, we next derive loglinear equations for wages and hiring. In
doing so, we identify the spillover eﬀects that make the wage bargain sensitive to the average wage
in a way that works to enhance wage rigidity. We also clarify how the horizon eﬀect that emerges
because ﬁrms and workers weight the future diﬀerently aﬀects the bargaining outcome.
We begin by deriving an expression for the target wage, wo
t (r), the forcing variable in the
diﬀerence equation for wages. Loglinearizing the target wage equation (33) gives
b wo
t (r)=
³
ϕfnb fnt + ϕxb xt (r)
´
+ ϕsEt
³
b st + b Ht+1 + b Λt,t+1
´
+ ϕχb χt (r), (39)
13Since each wt−1(i) is weighted by nt(i)/nt and not nt−1(i)/nt−1,
U 1
0 wt−1(i)
nt(i)
nt di is not quite identical to
wt−1. However, given that the employment shares are constant in the steady state, the dynamics of this integral are
equivalent to the dynamics of wt−1,u pt oaﬁrst order.
13where ϕfn = χfnw−1,ϕ x = χκx2w−1,ϕ s = χsκxw−1,ϕ χ = χ
£
fn +( κ/2)x2 − b − sβH
¤
w−1.
Note that b z denotes the percent deviation of variable z from its steady state value and the coeﬃcients
are either parameters or steady state values of variables.14
The ﬁrst two terms in parentheses in equation (39) reﬂect factors that move the target wage
in the case of conventional period-by-period bargaining. The ﬁrst captures the variation in the
marginal worker’s contribution to ﬁrm value. The second captures the variation in the worker’s
forgone beneﬁt from unemployment. In addition to these conventional factors, however, the target
wage is also inﬂuenced by the horizon eﬀect on bargaining that arises with multi-period contracting.
The horizon eﬀect inﬂuences b wo
t (r) in two ways. First, movements in the conventional factors
that cause b wo
t (r) to vary are multiplied by the steady state horizon-adjusted bargaining weight,
χ = η/[η +( 1− η)Σ/∆], as opposed to the pure weight η. As we noted in the previous section,
this adjustment in eﬀect raises the relative weight assigned to ﬁrms, leading to workers grabbing a
smaller share of the variation in the surplus. (Note χ<η ). Second, the horizon adjusted bargaining
weight χt (r) m a yv a r y ,l e a d i n gt oad i r e c ti n ﬂuence on b wo
t (r), as captured by the third term in
equation (39). Speciﬁcally, loglinearizing equations (25), (26) and (31), yields:
b χt (r)=−(1 − χ)
³
b Σt (r) − b ∆t
´
, (40)
with
b Σt(r)=xλβb xt(r)+λβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b Σt+1 (r)
´
, (41)
b ∆t = ρλβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b ∆t+1
´
. (42)
In particular, χt (r) may vary due to relative movement in the ﬁrm and worker cumulative discount
factors, Σt (r) and ∆t, respectively. Note that b Σt(r) depends on the hiring rate b xt(r),s i n c et h e
latter inﬂuences the ﬁrm’s subsequent employment relative to current employment, one of the
determinants of its cumulative discount factor. (See equations (6), (7) and (25)).
O b s e r v et h a ta sw em o v et ot h el i m i t i n gc a s eo fﬂexible wages (λ =0 ), the horizon eﬀect
disappears: χt (r) becomes a constant equal to η. The variation in the target wage then corresponds
to the conventional outcome for period-by-period Nash bargaining.
While the horizon eﬀect adds a new dimension to the bargaining problem, it is important to
stress that it is unlikely to be quantitatively important. As we show in the next section, given a
monthly job survival probability ρ that is consistent with the evidence, the diﬀerence between the
ﬁrm and worker cumulative discount factors is not suﬃciently large for the horizon eﬀect to have
as i g n i ﬁcant eﬀect on the outcome. In this instance, the steady state horizon-adjusted bargaining
weight χ does not diﬀer much from the primitive bargaining weight η.N o rd o e sχt (r) vary much.
We next turn to analyzing the spillover eﬀect of market wages on the wage bargain. It turns out
that there is both a direct and indirect spillover eﬀect. The direct eﬀect arises because the worker’s
14Since up to a ﬁrst order approximation e Hx,t+1 = e Ht+1,w ed r o pt h es u b s c r i p tx (see the appendix).
14outside option depends on the wage he or she can expect to earn elsewhere. As the appendix
shows, by making use of the Nash bargaining condition at t +1and the period t vacancy posting
condition, the discounted surplus of moving from unemployment today to employment next period,
conditional on ﬁnding a job, may be expressed in loglinear form as
Et
³
b Ht+1 + b Λt,t+1
´
= b xt +( 1− χ)
−1 Etb χt+1 + ΓEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
, (43)
where
Γ =( 1− xηΨ)η−1 Σw,
with Ψ = βλ2/
¡
1 − βλ2¢
, Σ =( 1− βλ)
−1,a n d  = β (κx)
−1. Note that since the steady state
hiring rate x is a number close to zero, under any reasonable calibration, the slope coeﬃcient Γ is
positive.
Intuitively, Et
³
b Ht+1 + b Λt,t+1
´
depends positively on the current hiring rate b xt since the latter
varies positively with the expected marginal surplus from labor at t+1. It also depend positively on
a worker’s expected bargaining power next period Etb χt+1. The spillover eﬀect, however, emerges
in the third term, which depends positively on the diﬀerence between the expected average market
wage Et b wt+1 and the contract wage Et b w∗
t+1. If, everything else equal, Et b wt+1 exceeds Et b w∗
t+1,
opportunities are unusually good for workers expecting to move into employment next period, and
vice-versa if Et b wt+1 is below Et b w∗
t+1. By inﬂuencing the worker’s outside option in this way, the
expected average market wage at t +1induces a direct spillover eﬀect on the wage bargain.
The indirect spillover emerges because the hiring rate of the renegotiating ﬁrm aﬀects the
bargaining outcome. It does so by inﬂuencing both the ﬁrm’s saving in adjustment costs and the
horizon-adjusted bargaining weight (because it aﬀects the ﬁrm’s cumulative discount factor.) The
diﬀerence between hiring rate b xt (r) and average hiring rate b xt depends positively on the diﬀerence
between the average market wage b wt and the contract wage b w∗
t:
b xt (r)=b xt + λ Σw(b wt − b w∗
t). (44)
The dependency of the hiring rate on the wage gap thus introduces an indirect spillover of market
wages on the bargaining problem.
Let b wo
t be the target wage absent the spillover eﬀects. Then combining equations (39), (43),
and (44), we can express b wo
t (r) as the sum of b wo
t and the direct and indirect spillovers:
b wo
t (r)=b wo
t +
τ1
1 − ρλβ
Et
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
+
τ2
1 − ρλβ
(b wt − b w∗
t), (45)
with
b wo
t = ϕfnb fnt +( ϕx + ϕs) b xt + ϕsb st + ϕχb χt +( 1− χ)
−1 ϕsEtb χt+1, (46)
and where τ1 and τ2 capture the direct and indirect spillovers, respectively
15τ1 = ϕsΓ(1 − ρλβ), (47)
τ2 =
£
ϕxλ − ϕχ (1 − χ)xΨ
¤
 Σw(1 − ρλβ).
Note that absent the adjustment for the horizon eﬀect on bargaining (captured by χ, b χt and Etb χt+1),
b wo
t would be precisely the wage under period-by-period Nash bargaining. It is also worth empha-
sizing now that, given our calibration, the direct spillover eﬀect captured by τ1 is quantitatively
more important than the indirect eﬀect captured by τ2. We report their values in the appendix.
Next, loglinearizing the equation for the contract wage and combining with the equation above
yields the contract wage as a ﬁrst order forward looking diﬀerence equation, with the target wage
as the forcing variable:
b w∗
t =( 1− ρλβ) b wo
t(r)+ρλβEt b w∗
t+1. (48)
The loglinearized wage index is in turn given by
b wt =( 1− λ) b w∗
t + λb wt−1. (49)
Combining these equations along with the relation for b wo
t(r) (equation (45)) then yields the
following second order diﬀerence equation which governs the evolution of the wage:
b wt = γb b wt−1 + γ b wo
t + γfEt b wt+1, (50)
where
γb =( 1 + τ2)φ−1 (51)
γ = ςφ−1
γf =( ρβ − τ1)φ−1
φ =1 + τ2 + ς + ρβ − τ1
ς =( 1 − λ)(1− ρλβ)λ−1
with γb + γ + γf =1 . Note the forcing variable in the diﬀerence equation is the “spillover free”
target wage b wo
t (see equation (46)).
Due to staggered contracting, b wt depends on the lagged wage b wt−1 as well as the expected
future wage Et b wt+1. Solving out for the reduced form of equation (50) will yield an expression
that relates the wage to the lagged wage and a discounted stream of expected future values of b wo
t.
Note that the spillover eﬀects, measured by τ1 and τ2 work to raise the relative importance of the
lagged wage (by raising γb) and reduce the importance of the expected future wage (by reducing
γf). In this way, the spillovers work to raise the inertia in the evolution of the wage. In this
respect, the spillover eﬀects work in a similar (though not identical) way as to how real relative
16price rigidities enhance nominal price stickiness in monetary models with time-dependent pricing
(see, for example, Woodford, 2003).
Note also that as we converge to λ =0(the case of period by period wage bargaining), both γb
and γf go to zero), implying that b wt simply tracks b wo
t in this instance. Further, as we noted earlier,
b wo
t, becomes identical to the wage in the ﬂexible case. The model thus nests the conventional
period-by-period wage bargaining setup.
Finally, loglinearizing the diﬀerence equation for the hiring rate (12) and aggregating economy-
wide yields:
b xt = Etb Λt,t+1 +  
³
fn b fnt+1 − wEt b wt+1
´
+ βEtb xt+1. (52)
The hiring rate thus depends on current and expected movements of the marginal product of labor
relative to the wage. The stickiness in the wage due to staggered contracting, everything else equal,
implies that current and expected movement in the marginal product of labor will have a greater
impact on the hiring rate than would have been the case otherwise.
We defer to the appendix a complete presentation of the loglinear equations of the model.
4M o d e l E v a l u a t i o n
4.1 Calibration
We choose a monthly calibration in order to properly capture the high rate of job ﬁnding in U.S.
data. Our parametrization is summarized in Table 1. There are ten parameters to which we need
to assign values. Four are conventional in the business cycle literature: the discount factor, β,t h e
depreciation rate, δ, the “share” parameter on capital in the Cobb-Douglas production function,
α, and the autoregressive parameter for the technology shock, ρa. We use conventional values for
all these parameters: β =0 .99
1
3, δ =0 .025/3, α =0 .33,a n dρa =0 .95
1
3. Note in contrast to the
frictionless labor market model, the term 1−α does not necessarily correspond to the labor share,
since the latter will in general depend on the outcome of the bargaining process. However, here we
simply follow convention by setting α =0 .33 to facilitate comparison with the RBC literature.15
15Note that while 1 − α does not correspond to the labor share, α corresponds to the capital share.
17Table 1: Values of parameters
Production function parameter α 0.33
Discount factor β 0.997
Capital depreciation rate δ 0.008
Technology autoregressive parameter ρa 0.983
Survival rate ρ 0.965
Elasticity of matches to unemployment σ 0.5
Job ﬁnding probability s 0.45
Bargaining power parameter η 0.5
Relative unemployment ﬂow value b 0.4
Renegotiation frequency λ 0.889
There are an additional ﬁve parameters that are speciﬁc to the conventional search and matching
framework: the job survival rate, ρ, the matching function parameter, σ, the bargaining power
parameter, η, the steady state job ﬁnding probability, s, and the relative unemployment ﬂow value,
b, equal to the ratio of the unemployment ﬂow value, b, to the steady state ﬂow contribution of the
worker to the match, fn + κ
2x2. We choose the average monthly separation rate 1−ρ based on the
observation that jobs last about two years and a half. Therefore, we set ρ =1− 0.035.W ec h o o s e
the elasticity of matches to unemployment, σ, to be equal to 0.5, the midpoint of values typically
used in the literature.16 This choice is within the range of plausible values of 0.5 to 0.7 reported by
Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) in their survey of the literature on the estimation of the matching
function. We then set s =0 .45 to match recent estimates of the U.S. average monthly job ﬁnding
rate (Shimer, 2005a).
To maintain comparability with much of the existing literature, we set the bargaining power
parameter η to be equal to 0.5.17 One of the few studies that provides direct estimates is Flinn
(2006), who ﬁnds a point estimates of 0.4, c l o s et ot h ev a l u ew eu s e .A na d d i t i o n a lj u s t i ﬁcation,
however, is that η =0 .5 implies a steady state labor share of 0.65, which is consistent with the
long run average of the labor share in the data. Finally, we note that η =0 .5 in conjunction with
σ =0 .5 ensures the eﬃciency of the equilibrium in the ﬂexible version of the model (Hosios, 1990).
Perhaps most controversial is the choice of b. We follow much of the literature by assuming that
the value of non work activities is far below what workers produce on the job (see Hall, NBER
Macroannual, 2005, p. 121, for a brief discussion). In particular, we speciﬁcally follow Shimer
16The values for σ used in the literature are: 0.24 in Hall (2005a), 0.4 in Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Andolfatto
(1994) and Merz (1995), 0.45 in Mortensen and Nagypal (2006), 0.5 in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2006), 0.5 in Farmer
(2004), 0.72 in Shimer (2005a). See also a brief discussion in Mortensen and Nagypal (2006), p. 10,c o m p a r i n gt h e i r
value of 0.45 to Shimer’s one.
17In the literature the bargaining power has been typically set either to satisfy the Hosios (1990) condition or to
achieve symmetric Nash barganing (equally shared surplus). This has led most researchers to set values in the range
0.4 to 0.5. Shimer (2005a) uses the somewhat larger value of 0.72.
18(2005a) and Hall (2005c) and set b =0 .4. Under the interpretation of b as unemployment beneﬁts,
this parametrization implies a steady state replacement ratio of 0.42 (since the steady state ratio
of the wage to the worker’s contribution to the job is 0.956.)
We next observe that given the parameter values chosen so far, the steady state of the model
pins down both the adjustment cost parameter, κ, and the steady state values of the labor share,
the unemployment rate and the hiring rate (see the appendix.). Table 2 gives these values, along
with the steady state consumption and investment shares. Note that as we discussed in the previ-
ous section, the horizon adjusted bargaining parameter χ does not vary much from the primitive
parameter η (0.44 versus 0.50).
Table 2: Implied steady state values
Unemployment rate u 0.07
Hiring rate x 0.035
Horizon-adjusted bargaining power χ 0.44
Labor share ls 0.65
Investment/output ratio I
y 0.24
Consumption/output ratio c
y 0.75
Adjustment costs/output ratio ac
y 0.01
Finally, there is one parameter that is speciﬁc to this model: the probability λ that a ﬁrm may
not renegotiate the wage. We pick λ to match the average frequency of wage contract negotiations.
While there is no systematic direct evidence on the frequency of wage negotiations, Taylor (1999)
argues that in most medium to large sized ﬁrms wages are typically adjusted once per year. He also
argues that this pattern characterizes union workers as well as non-union workers, including in the
latter workers who do not have formal employment contracts. In addition, based on microeconomic
data on hourly wages, Gottschalk (2005) concludes that wage adjustments are most common a
year after the last change. This evidence, of course applies primarily to base pay. There are,
however, other components such as bonuses that might be adjusted more frequently over the year,
though it is very unclear how important these adjustments might be in practice. Nonetheless, to be
conservative, for our baseline case we set λ =1−1/9, implying that wage contracts are renegotiated
on average once every 3 quarters. We then consider the case of a 4 quarter average contract length
as a robustness exercise.
4.2 Results
We judge the model against quarterly U.S. data from 1964:1-2005:1. For series that are available
monthly, we take quarterly averages. Since the artiﬁcial series that the model generates are based
on a monthly calibration, we also take quarterly averages of this data.
19Most of the data is from the BLS. All variables are measured in logs. Output y is production
in the non-farm business sector. The labor share ls and output per worker y/n are similarly from
the non-farm business sector. The wage w is average hourly earnings of production workers in
the private sector, deﬂated by the CPI. Employment n is all employees in the non-farm sector.
Unemployed u is civilian unemployment 16 years old and over. Vacancies v are based on the help
wanted advertising index from the Conference Board. Finally, the data are HP ﬁltered with a
conventional smoothing weight.
We examine the behavior of the model taking the technology shock as the exogenous driving
force. To illustrate how the wage contracting process aﬀects model dynamics, we ﬁrst examine
the impulse responses of the model economy to a unit increase in total factor productivity. The
solid line in each panel of Figure 1 illustrates the response of the respective variable for our model.
For comparison, the dotted line reports the response of the conventional ﬂexible wage model with
period-by-period Nash bargaining (obtained by setting λ =0 ).
Observe that in the conventional case with period-by-period wage adjustment, the response of
employment is relatively modest, conﬁrming the arguments of Hall and Shimer. There is also only
a modest response of other indicators of labor market activity, such as vacancies, v, unemployment
u, labor market tightness, θ = v/u, and the hiring rate x. Wages, by contrast, adjust quickly.
The resulting small adjustment of employment leads to output dynamics that closely mimic the
technology shock.
By contrast, in the model with staggered multiperiod contracting, the hiring rate jumps sharply
in the wake of the technology shock along with the measures of labor market activity. A substantial
rise in employment follows, certainly as compared to the conventional ﬂexible wage case. Associated
with the rise in employment, is a smooth drawn out adjustment in wages, directly a product of
the staggered multiperiod contracting. The lagged rise in employment leads to a humped shaped
response of output, i.e., output continues to rise for several periods before reverting to trend, in
contrast to the technology shock which reverts immediately.
We next explore how well the model economy is able to account the overall volatility in the
data. Table 3 reports the standard deviation, autocorrelation, and contemporaneous correlation
with output for the nine key variables in the U.S. economy and in the model economy. The standard
deviations are normalized relative to output.
Overall the model economy for the baseline case (3 quarters) appears to capture well most of
the basic features of the data. It comes reasonably close to capturing the relative volatilities and
co-movements of the key indicators of labor market activity, including unemployment u, vacancies v
and the tightness measure θ. These were the variables emphasized in the Hall/Shimer analysis. The
model only captures about sixty percent of the relative volatility of employment. However, here it is
important to keep in mind that the framework abstracts from labor force participation, a non-trivial
source of cyclical employment volatility. (We also emphasize that perhaps for this consideration,
the papers in literature typically avoid reporting statistics on employment volatility.)
20Table 3: Aggregate Statistics
yw l s n u v θy / n
US Economy, 1964:1-2005:01
Relative Standard Deviation 1.00 0.52 0.51 0.60 5.15 6.30 11.28 0.61
Autocorrelation 0.87 0.91 0.73 0.94 0.91 0.91 0.91 0.79
Correlation with y 1.00 0.56 −0.20 0.78 −0.86 0.91 0.90 0.71
Model Economy, λ → 3Q
Relative Standard Deviation 1.00 0.56 0.57 0.35 4.46 5.83 9.88 0.71
Autocorrelation 0.84 0.95 0.65 0.90 0.90 0.83 0.88 0.76
Correlation with y 1.00 0.66 −0.56 0.77 −0.77 0.91 0.94 0.97
Model Economy, λ → 4Q
Relative Standard Deviation 1.00 0.47 0.58 0.44 5.66 7.25 12.47 0.64
Autocorrelation 0.85 0.96 0.68 0.91 0.91 0.86 0.90 0.74
Correlation with y 1.00 0.56 −0.59 0.78 −0.78 0.94 0.95 0.95
A distinguishing feature of our analysis is that we appear to capture wage dynamics. Note that
we come very close to matching the relative volatility of wages (0.56 versus 0.52 in the data), their
autocorrelation (0.95 versus 0.91 in the data) and the contemporaneous correlation of wages with
output (0.66 versus 0.56 in the data).
As we noted earlier, we assumed three quarter average length wage contracts for our baseline
case to error on the side of caution, even though the evidence suggests that the modal period of
wage adjustments is one year. In the bottom panel of Table 3 we also report statistics based on four
quarter average length wage contracts. Interestingly, the performance of the model improves overall.
Not surprising, the enhanced wage rigidity raises the volatilities of the labor market variables. In the
end, the model tracks the relative volatilities and co-movements of the key labor market variables,
u,v,a n dθ as well as in the baseline case. The model, however, is also now able to capture nearly
three quarters of the relative volatility of employment.
We next consider several variations of the model designed to illustrate what features are im-
portant. First, as we also discussed earlier, the inertia in wage dynamics is not simply a product
of staggered multi-period contracting, but also of the spillover eﬀect of economy-wide wages on
the individual wage bargain that arises in this kind of environment. To quantify the importance
of these spillovers for model dynamics, we simulate the model eliminating the spillover eﬀects on
wage dynamics. In particular, we set equal to zero the parameters τ1 and τ2,w h i c hg o v e r nt h e
magnitude of the spillover eﬀect, in equations (50) and (51).
21Table 4: The Spillover Eﬀect and Other Robustness Exercises
Relative Standard Deviations
ywl snuv θy / n
Model Economy 1.00 0.56 0.57 0.35 4.46 5.83 9.88 0.71
Model Economy - No Spillover 1.00 0.70 0.48 0.18 2.35 3.18 5.25 0.84
Model Economy - Flexible Wages 1.00 0.88 0.09 0.10 1.25 1.58 2.74 0.93
Flexible Wages - Standard Hiring Costs 1.00 0.93 0.02 0.06 0.72 1.01 1.63 0.95
Model Economy - No Horizon Eﬀect 1.00 0.53 0.53 0.39 5.13 6.70 11.37 0.67
Table 4 reports the results. As the table makes clear, eliminating the spillovers signiﬁcantly
enhances wage ﬂexibility and reduces employment volatility. When the spillovers are removed, the
relative volatility of wages jumps nearly ﬁfty percent, from 0.56 to 0.70 . Conversely, the relative
volatility of employment is reduced roughly in half, from 0.35 to 0.18. The other measures of labor
activity u, v and θ similarly fall by about half. Overall, the spillovers are responsible for about
a half of the added rigidity in wages relative to the ﬂexible benchmark model and for about two
thirds of the added volatility in the labor market. Thus, the wage inertia and resulting employment
dynamics in our model are not only a product of staggered multiperiod wage contracting, but also
of the spillover eﬀects from the Nash bargaining process.
The next two rows of the table makes clear that our assumption of quadratic adjustment costs
is not responsible for the ability of our baseline model to account for the key moments of the data.
The model with ﬂexible wages and quadratic adjustment costs performs about as poorly as the
conventional formulation with proportional hiring costs. It is thus the presence of staggered wage
contracting in conjunction with the spillover eﬀects that account for the results in Table 3.
The last row of Table 4 presents information on the importance of the horizon eﬀect on the
wage bargain. The row presents the model statistics for our baseline case, but with the horizon
eﬀect shut oﬀ (i.e., χt (r) ﬁxed at η). The relative volatilities remain close to those arising in the
baseline case. Thus, as we conjectured, the horizon eﬀect is not that important quantitatively.
Finally, it is interesting to compare our analysis with Hagedorn and Manovskii (HM, 2006).
They ﬁnd from micro data that the wage elasticity with respect to labor productivity is 0.47.A s
we noted earlier, they choose parameters to have the model match this elasticity. To do so, they
require a very low value of η, the bargaining power of workers, and a very high value of b,t h er e l a t i v e
steady state ﬂow value of unemployment, as compared to what is conventional in the literature. In
22particular, they require η very close to zero, well below the conventionally used value of 0.5, as well
as Flinn’s (2006) estimate of 0.4. In addition they require b close to unity, well above Shimer (2005a)
and Hall’s (2005c) preferred value of 0.4. A value of b c l o s et ou n i t y ,o fc o u r s ei m p l i e st h a tw o r k e r s
are nearly indiﬀerent between employment and unemployment. The overall calibration eﬀectively
makes labor supply highly elastic, enabling the model to have large employment movements with
moderate wage adjustments. Nonetheless, while the HM framework is able to account for labor
market volatility, the resulting calibration is not without controversy.18
Interestingly, we ﬁnd from our macro data that the wage elasticity with respect to labor pro-
ductivity is 0.53, which is very close to the estimate that the authors obtained from micro evidence.
However, as we suggested earlier, we stick with conventional values of η and b, and instead introduce
wage sluggishness by appealing to staggered multi-period contracts. Further, as opposed to picking
parameters to match the wage elasticity, we calibrate the average duration of wages contracts to
match the evidence. We then ask how well the model explains the wage elasticity (along with other
volatilities.) It turns out the model does very well on this accounting, generating a wage elasticity
of 0.50, nearly identical to what our data suggests.
In addition, as we observed in Table 3, our model does well at explaining the overall cycli-
cal volatility of wages, including the co-movement with aggregate activity as well as the relative
volatility. On the other hand, the HM model does not do well on this dimension, even though it is
calibrated to match the wage elasticity with respect to productivity. How can this be? Note that
since this elasticity, el(w,p),i se ﬀectively a regression coeﬃcient from the regression of log wages
on log productivity it equals the product of the correlation corr(w,p) and the relative standard
deviations σw/σp. Since the HM calibration only ﬁxes the product of these two moments, it needs
not do well at matching them individually. This turns out to be the case, as we show next.
Table 5 compares values of el(w,p),c o r r (w,p) and σw/σp against U.S. data for three models:
the conventional Mortensen and Pissarides model (with capital), the framework based on the HM
calibration, and our baseline model with staggered wage contracting (GT). While the HM model
captures el(w,p) by construction, it misses badly on the other two moments. The correlation
between wages and productivity is too high (unity versus 0.62 in the data) while the relative
volatility of wages is too low (0.49 versus 0.85). The former outcome is due to the period by
period Nash bargaining that ties aggregate wage movements to current period productivity. The
latter result arises from the low bargaining power of workers which forces their wages close to
their reservation values. Thus while the HM model by construction matches el(w,p),i td o e ss ob y
inducing oﬀsetting errors in corr(w,p) and σw/σp.
18In addition to having values of η and b that are at variance with the literature, Hornstein, Krusell and Violante
(2005) note that the HM calibration implies suspiciously large employment eﬀects from changes in unemployment
insurance.
23Table 5: Wages and Labor Share Statistics
el(w,p) corr(w,p) σw/σp
U.S. data 0.53 0.62 0.85
MP baseline 0.98 1.00 0.98
HM 0.49 1.00 0.49
GT 0.50 0.62 0.80
el(ls,p) corr(ls,p) σls/σp
U.S. data -0.50 -0.60 0.83
MP baseline -0.02 -0.96 0.02
HM -0.51 -1.00 0.51
GT -0.51 -0.64 0.80
By contrast, our model does well at matching not only the wage elasticity but also the correlation
of wages and productivity, as well as the relative volatility. The staggered contract structure works
to dampen the correlation between productivity and wages. At the same time, because workers
have more bargaining power than in the HM calibration, wages are more sensitive to productivity
movements, permitting the model to match the data. Again, we stress that our model is calibrated
to match the average duration of contract lengths. It is therefore not by construction that we match
the wage elasticity, in contrast to HM.
Finally, the bottom part of Table 5 shows that similar conclusions apply for the volatility of the
labor share. While the HM model does not explain all the relevant moments well, our framework
does.
5 Bargaining Set
A key maintained hypothesis in our analysis is that workers and ﬁrms can expect that they will not
want to voluntarily dissipate their relationship over the life of their relationship. This assumption
simpliﬁes how both parties form expectations when they enter relationships. Here we demonstrate
that this condition holds to a reasonable approximation. Put diﬀerently, under our parametrization,
wages have a negligible probability of falling outside the bargaining set. Intuitively, given our
Poisson process for contract adjustment, only a very small fraction of contracts will have a duration
suﬃciently long for the wage to move out of the bargaining set.19
19Note that we could have instead employed a “truncated” Poisson process where the probability of renegotiation
is Poisson for N periods and then unity for any contract that has lasted N periods. Assuming N is not too large -
say 40 months (see below) - then we could guarantee ﬁrms never go out of the bargaining set with certainty. Given
24Note ﬁrst that the lower and upper limits of the bargaining set are given by, respectively, the
reservation wage of the marginal worker and the reservation wage of the ﬁrm20.T h e s e l i m i t s
will depend on the time elapsed since the ﬁrm has last negotiated a contract, denoted by τ.T h e
appendix derives loglinear expressions for the worker reservation wage, denoted Rw
t (τ),a n dt h eﬁrm
reservation wage, denoted R
f
t (τ). Given these expressions we can then check whether a contract
wage set τ periods earlier, w∗
t (τ), lies within the bargaining set, i.e., whether, Rw
t (τ) <w ∗
t (τ) <
R
f
t (τ).
We emphasize ﬁr s tt h a tf o rt h et y p i c a lﬁrm in the midst of a contract, the bargaining set is quite
wide. Figure 2 displays a time series of the bargaining set (based on artiﬁcial time series generated
by the model), for ﬁrms on a contract that has been in place for three quarters, the average length.
Note that the contract lies safely within the bargaining set throughout the time series.21
It is possible, however, that a small fraction of ﬁrms could stay on contracts well beyond the
average length. Thus, we need to determine a threshold value for contract duration τ, where the
contract wage still remains in the bargaining set. Note that the probability that a contract will last
more than τ periods is given by the per period probability the contract will not be renegotiated,
λ,r a i s e dt ot h eτ power, i.e., λτ. Given the law of large numbers, this will also correspond to
the percentage of existing contracts that have lasted more than τ periods. This percentage thus
declines exponentially with τ.
We pick a threshold value for τ such that the fraction of contracts outstanding that have lasted
more than τ periods is 0.0089 (a number less than one percent). We then check for the ninety nine
percent plus of contracts that have lasted τ periods or less, whether the contract wage remains in
the bargaining set. If this is the case, then we argue that violations of our maintained hypothesis
are negligible from a quantitative standpoint.
Speciﬁcally, we set τ to satisfy λτ =( 1− 1/9)
τ =0 .0089, which leads to a value τ equal to
40 (months). We then generate artiﬁcial times series from our model and ask whether the wage
lies within the bargaining set for contracts of duration 40 months or less. Figure 3 displays the
results. For our cutoﬀ, the wage is always in the bargaining set. We therefore conclude that for
99.11 percent of ﬁrms this condition is satisﬁed.
While the wage lies safely within the bargaining set for ﬁrms on contracts that have lasted
three quarters, for (the small fraction of) ﬁrms that have been for 40 months, the boundaries
of the bargaining set vary much closer to the wage. What this suggests is that if one wishes to
add idiosyncratic shocks, it may be necessary to alter the simple binomial process for contract
adjustment, where a small fraction of ﬁrms can remain indeﬁnitely on the contract, by imposing a
terminal length that any contract can survive.
our calibration, however, the truncated Poisson generated results nearly identical to what our simple Poisson process
gives. The gain from using the simple process is that the algebra stays simple.
20Note that all workers with the ﬁrm will have the same reservation wage, regardless of whether they are new or
old.
21Note that in ﬁgures 2 and 3 wages are plot in levels.
256C o n c l u d i n g R e m a r k s
We have modiﬁed the Mortensen and Pissarides model of unemployment dynamics to allow for
staggered multiperiod wage contracting. What emerges is a tractable relation for wage dynamics
that is a natural generalization of the period-by-period Nash bargaining outcome in the conventional
formulation. An interesting side-product is the emergence of spillover eﬀects of aggregate wages
that inﬂuence the bargaining process. We then show that a reasonable calibration of the model
can account reasonably well for the cyclical behavior of wages and labor market activity observed
in the data. The spillover eﬀects turn out to be important in this respect.
As we noted earlier, in addition to the presence of the spillover eﬀects, another important
diﬀerence from existing macroeconomic models that rely on staggered multiperiod wage setting (e.g.
Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Smets and Wouters (2003)) is that in our framework
wages aﬀect the adjustment of employment along the extensive margin, as opposed to the intensive
margin. As Hall has recently emphasized, for adjustment on the intensive margin, wages may not be
allocational, as originally argued by Barro (1977). The same criticism, however, does not apply to
adjustment on the extensive margin. For this reason it may be interesting to consider our approach
with employment adjustment along the extensive margin as a way to shore up a potential weakness
of these conventional macroeconomic models. Trigari (2004) and Walsh (2005), for example, have
integrated the search and matching framework within a monetary model that has many of the same
features as these models, including nominal price stickiness. In their framework, though, there is
period-by-period wage bargaining. We think it may be straightforward to extend their analysis by
incorporating our model of staggered wage contracting. We expect that doing so will improve the
overall empirical performance.
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29APPENDIX A
A1. Sum of expected future wages for a worker at a ﬁrm renegotiating at t, Ww
t (r)
• Let Ww
t (r) denote the discounted sum of expected future wages to be received by a worker
over the life of the relationship at a ﬁrm renegotiating at t:
Ww
t (r)=Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρβ)
s Λt,t+swt+s (r)
= wt (r)+( ρβ)EtΛt,t+1wt+1 (r)+( ρβ)
2 EtΛt,t+2wt+2 (r)+...
• At a ﬁrm renegotiating at time t, the current and future expected wages are given by:
wt (r)=w∗
t
Etwt+1 (r)=λw∗
t +( 1− λ)Etw∗
t+1
Etwt+2 (r)=λ
£
λw∗
t +( 1− λ)Etw∗
t+1
¤
+( 1− λ)Etw∗
t+2
= λ2w∗
t + λ(1 − λ)Etw∗
t+1 +( 1− λ)Etw∗
t+2
and so on....
• Using these expressions, we can write:
Ww
t (r)=w∗
t
+(ρβ)EtΛt,t+1
£
λw∗
t +( 1− λ)w∗
t+1
¤
+(ρβ)
2 EtΛt,t+2
£
λ2w∗
t + λ(1 − λ)w∗
t+1 +( 1− λ)w∗
t+2
¤
+...
• Collecting terms:
Ww
t (r)=Et
h
1+( ρλβ)Λt,t+1 +( ρβλ)
2 Λt,t+2 + ...
i
w∗
t
+(1− λ)(ρβ)EtΛt,t+1
h
1+( ρλβ)Λt+1,t+2 +( ρλβ)
2 Λt+1,t+3 + ...
i
w∗
t+1
+(1− λ)(ρβ)
2 EtΛt,t+2
h
1+( ρλβ)Λt+2,t+3 +( ρλβ)
2 Λt+2,t+4 + ...
i
w∗
t+2
+...
• Letting
∆t = Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρλβ)
s Λt,t+s
30we have
Ww
t (r)=∆tw∗
t
+(1− λ)(ρβ)EtΛt,t+1∆t+1w∗
t+1
+(1− λ)(ρβ)
2 EtΛt,t+2∆t+2w∗
t+2
+...
• Finally, rearranging:
Ww
t (r)=∆tw∗
t +( 1− λ)Et
∞ P
s=1
(ρβ)
s Λt,t+s∆t+sw∗
t+s
A2. Sum of expected future wages for a ﬁrm renegotiating at t, W
f
t (r)
• Let W
f
t (r) denote the discounted sum of expected future wage payments by a ﬁrm renegoti-
ating at t over both the existing contract and subsequent contracts:
W
f
t (r)=Et
∞ P
s=0
nt+s
nt
(r)βsΛt,t+swt+s (r)
= wt (r)+Et
nt+1
nt
(r)βΛt,t+1wt+1 (r)+Et
nt+2
nt
(r)β2Λt,t+2wt+2 (r)+...
• Using the expressions for the future expected wages, we can write:
W
f
t (r)=w∗
t
+Et
nt+1
nt
(r)βΛt,t+1
£
λw∗
t +( 1− λ)w∗
t+1
¤
+Et
nt+2
nt
(r)β2Λt,t+2
£
λ2w∗
t + λ(1 − λ)w∗
t+1 +( 1− λ)w∗
t+2
¤
+...
• Collecting terms:
W
f
t (r)=Et
∙
1+
nt+1
nt
(r)(λβ)Λt,t+1 +
nt+2
nt
(r)(λβ)
2 Λt,t+2 + ...
¸
w∗
t
+(1− λ)Et
nt+1
nt
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∙
1+
nt+2
nt+1
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¸
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31• Letting
Σt (r)=Et
∞ P
s=0
nt+s
nt
(r)(λβ)
s Λt,t+s
we have
W
f
t (r)=Σt (r)w∗
t
+(1− λ)Et
nt+1
nt
(r)βΛt,t+1Σt+1 (r)w∗
t+1
+(1− λ)Et
nt+2
nt
(r)β2Λt,t+2Σt+2 (r)w∗
t+2
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• Finally, rearranging
W
f
t (r)=Σt (r)w∗
t +( 1− λ)Et
∞ P
s=1
nt+s
nt
(r)βsΛt,t+sΣt+sw∗
t+s
A3. Worker surplus at a ﬁrm renegotiating at t, Ht (r)
• The worker surplus at a ﬁrm renegotiating at t is
Ht (r)=wt (r) − b + ρβEtΛt,t+1Ht+1 (r) − stβEtΛt,t+1Hx,t+1
= Ww
t (r) − Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρβ)
s Λt,t+s [b + st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Hx,t+s+1]
• Substituting the expression for Ww
t (r),w eg e t
Ht (r)=∆tw∗
t − Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρβ)
s Λt,t+s [b + st+sβΛt+s,t+s+1Hx,t+s+1
−(1 − λ)(ρβ)Λt+s,t+s+1∆t+s+1w∗
t+s+1
¤
A4. Firm marginal surplus for a ﬁrm renegotiating at t, Jt (r)
• The value of a marginal worker for a ﬁrm renegotiating at t is
Jt (r)=fnt − wt (r)+
κ
2
xt (r)
2 + ρβEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 (r)
= Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρβ)
s Λt,t+s
h
fnt+s +
κ
2
xt+s (r)
2
i
− Ww
t (r)
32• Substituting the expression for Ww
t (r),w eg e t
Jt (r)=Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρβ)
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h
fnt+s +
κ
2
xt+s (r)
2 − (1 − λ)(ρβ)Λt+s,t+s+1∆t+s+1w∗
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• Using the vacancy posting condition, the value of a marginal worker can similarly be expressed
as discounted proﬁts per worker:
Jt (r)=fnt − wt (r) −
κ
2
xt (r)
2 +[ ρ + xt (r)]βEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 (r)
= fnt − wt (r) −
κ
2
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nt+1
nt
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= Et
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nt+s
nt
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A5. The contract wage
• The Nash ﬁrst-order condition is
χt (r)Jt (r)=( 1− χt (r))Ht (r)
with
χt (r)=
η
η +( 1− η)Σt (r)/∆t
• Substituting Jt (r) and Ht (r) and rearranging, we obtain:
∆tw∗
t = Et
∞ P
s=0
(ρβ)
s Λt,t+s
h
χt+s (r)
³
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κ
2
xt+s (r)
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´
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¤
• The above equation can be written in a recursive form in the following way:
∆tw∗
t = χt (r)
³
fnt +
κ
2
xt (r)
2
´
+( 1− χt (r))(b + stβEtΛt,t+1Hx,t+1)
−(1 − λ)ρβEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w∗
t+1 + ρβEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w∗
t+1
• Simplifying, we obtain
∆tw∗
t = wo
t (r)+ρλβEtΛt,t+1∆t+1w∗
t+1
with wo
t (r) denoting the target wage:
wo
t (r)=χt (r)
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33A6. The loglinearized target wage
• Let Vt be the unconditional average value of employment at t and Vx,t the average value of
employment at t conditional on being a new hire:
Vt =
Z 1
0
Vt (i)
nt(i)
nt
di
Vx,t =
Z 1
0
Vt (i)
xt−1(i)nt−1(i)
xt−1nt−1
di
Note that Vt and Vx,t are identical up to a ﬁrst order approximation:
b Vt = b Vx,t
This implies that Ht = Vt − Ut and Hx,t = Vx,t − Ut are also identical up to a ﬁrst order:
b Ht = b Hx,t
• Loglinearizing the target wage then yields
b wo
t (r)=
h
ϕfnb fnt + ϕxb xt (r)
i
+ ϕsEt
h
b st + b Ht+1 + b Λt,t+1
i
+ ϕχb χt (r)
where
ϕfn = χfnw−1 ϕx = χκx2w−1 ϕs = χsκxw−1 ϕχ = χ
£
fn +( κ/2)x2 − b − sβH
¤
w−1
• Finally, the weight in the target wage is
χt (r)=
η
η +( 1− η)Σt (r)/∆t
with
∆t =1+ρλβEtΛt,t+1∆t+1
Σt (r)=1+[ ρ + xt (r)](λβ)EtΛt,t+1Σt+1 (r)
Loglinearizing yields
b χt (r)=−(1 − χ)
³
b Σt (r) − b ∆t
´
with
b ∆t = ρλβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b ∆t+1
´
b Σt (r)=xλβb xt (r)+λβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b Σt+1 (r)
´
34A7. Hiring rate at a ﬁrm renegotiating at t, xt (r)
• Let xt be the unconditional average value of the hiring rate:
xt =
Z 1
0
xt (i)
nt(i)
nt
di
• Using the job creation condition, xt can be written as
κxt = βEtΛt,t+1
³
fnt+1 +
κ
2
xt+1
2 − wt+1 + ρκxt+1
´
+ ςx
t
with
ςx
t = βEtΛt,t+1
∙Z 1
0
³κ
2
xt+1(i)2 − wt+1(i)+ρκxt+1(i)
´ nt(i)
nt
di −
³κ
2
xt+1
2 − wt+1 + ρκxt+1
´¸
• Loglinearizing yields:
b xt = Etb Λt,t+1 +  
³
fnEt b fnt+1 − wEt b wt+1
´
+ βEtb xt+1
with
  = β (κx)
−1
and where
b ςx
t =0
• Consider now a ﬁrm renegotiating at time t.W ec a nw r i t e :
b xt − b xt (r)=− wEt (b wt+1 − b wt+1 (r)) + βEt (b xt+1 − b xt+1 (r))
which can be iterated forward to give:
b xt − b xt (r)=− wEt (b wt+1 − b wt+1 (r))
−β wEt (b wt+2 − b wt+2 (r))
−β2 wEt (b wt+3 − b wt+3 (r))
−...
• Using the loglinear version of the wage index (37):
b wt = λb wt−1 +( 1− λ) b w∗
t
together with the loglinear expressions for the expected future wages at a ﬁrm renegotiating
at time t (see section A1), we obtain
Et (b wt+1 − b wt+1 (r)) = λ(b wt − b w∗
t)
Et (b wt+1 − b wt+1 (r)) = λ2 (b wt − b w∗
t)
and so on....
35• Substituting and rearranging yields:
b xt (r)=b xt + λ Σw(b wt − b w∗
t)
with
Σ =
1
1 − λβ
A8. Expected average worker surplus at ﬁrm renegotiating at t, EtHt+1
A8a. Average worker surplus Ht and ﬁrm marginal surplus Jt
• The unconditional average value of worker surplus Ht can be written as:
Ht = wt − b +( ρ − st)βEtΛt,t+1Ht+1 + ςw
t
with
ςw
t = βEtΛt,t+1
∙
ρ
µZ 1
0
Vt+1 (i)
nt(i)
nt
di − Vt+1
¶
− st
µZ 1
0
Vt+1 (i)
xt(i)nt(i)
xtnt
− Vt+1
¶¸
• The unconditional average value of ﬁrm marginal surplus Jt can be written as:
Jt = fnt − wt +
κ
2
x2
t + ρβEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 + ς
f
t
with
ς
f
t =
κ
2
µZ 1
0
κ
2
x2
t(i)
nt(i)
nt
di −
κ
2
x2
t
¶
+ ρβEtΛt,t+1
µZ 1
0
Jt+1 (i)
nt(i)
nt
di − Jt+1
¶
• Loglinearizing Ht and Jt and rearranging
b Ht =( 1− χ)χ−1 wb wt + ρβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b Ht+1
´
− sβEt
³
b st + b Λt,t+1 + b Ht+1
´
b Jt =  fn b fnt + xβb xt −  w b wt + ρβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b Jt+1
´
where
b ςw
t = b ς
f
t =0
• Then we can write the following expressions22:
b Ht − b Ht (i)=( 1− χ)χ−1 w(b wt − b wt (i)) + ρβEt
³
b Ht+1 − b Ht+1 (i)
´
b Jt − b Jt (i)=xβ (b xt − b xt (i)) −  w(b wt − b wt (i)) + ρβEt
³
b Jt+1 − b Jt+1 (i)
´
22Note we are using Et e Hx,t+1 = Et e Ht+1.
36A8b. Expected worker surplus at a ﬁrm renegotiating at t +1 , EtHt+1 (r0)
• Consider a ﬁrm renegotiating at time t +1 . We can write:
Et
³
b Ht+1 − b Ht+1
¡
r0¢´
=( 1 − χ)χ−1 wEt
¡
b wt+1 − b wt+1
¡
r0¢¢
+ ρβEt
³
b Ht+2 − b Ht+2
¡
r0¢´
=( 1 − χ)χ−1 wEt
£¡
b wt+1 − b wt+1
¡
r0¢¢
+ ρβ
¡
b wt+2 − b wt+2
¡
r0¢¢
+ ...
¤
• Note that, for a ﬁrm renegotiating at time t +1 ,w eh a v e :
Et
¡
b wt+1 − b wt+1
¡
r0¢¢
= Et
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
Et
¡
b wt+2 − b wt+2
¡
r0¢¢
= Et
£
λb wt+1 +( 1− λ) b w∗
t+2
¤
− Et
£
λb wt+1
¡
r0¢
+( 1− λ) b w∗
t+2
¤
= λEt
¡
b wt+1 − b wt+1
¡
r0¢¢
= λEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
Et
¡
b wt+3 − b wt+3
¡
r0¢¢
= Et
£
λb wt+2 +( 1− λ) b w∗
t+3
¤
− Et
£
λb wt+2
¡
r0¢
+( 1− λ) b w∗
t+3
¤
= λEt
¡
b wt+2 − b wt+2
¡
r0¢¢
= λ2Et
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
and so on....
• Substituting these expressions and rearranging:
Et b Ht+1
¡
r0¢
= Et b Ht+1 − (1 − χ)χ−1 ∆wEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
with
∆ =
1
1 − ρλβ
A8c. Expected ﬁrm marginal surplus for a ﬁrm renegotiating at t +1 , EtJt+1 (r0)
• We can write:
Et
³
b Jt+1 − b Jt+1
¡
r0¢´
= xβEt
¡
b xt+1 − b xt+1
¡
r0¢¢
−  wEt
¡
b wt+1 − b wt+1
¡
r0¢¢
+ρβEt
³
b Jt+2 − b Jt+2
¡
r0¢´
= xβEt
£¡
b xt+1 − b xt+1
¡
r0¢¢
+ ρβ
¡
b xt+2 − b xt+2
¡
r0¢¢
+ ...
¤
− wEt
£¡
b wt+1 − b wt+1
¡
r0¢¢
+ ρβ
¡
b wt+2 − b wt+2
¡
r0¢¢
+ ...
¤
37• Moreover, we have:
Et
¡
b xt+1
¡
r0¢
− b xt+1
¢
= λ ΣwEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
Et
¡
b xt+2
¡
r0¢
− b xt+2
¢
= λ2 ΣwEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
Et
¡
b xt+3
¡
r0¢
− b xt+3
¢
= λ3 ΣwEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
and so on....
• Substituting the expressions for the expected future wages and hiring rates and rearranging:
Et b Jt+1
¡
r0¢
= Et b Jt+1 +  ΣwEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
with
Σ =
1
1 − λβ
A8d. Weight in the Nash bargaining ﬁrst order condition
• Recall that
b χt (r)=−(1 − χ)
³
b Σt (r) − b ∆t
´
with
b ∆t = ρλβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b ∆t+1
´
b Σt (r)=xλβb xt (r)+λβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b Σt+1 (r)
´
• Averaging across all ﬁrms the ﬁrm cumulative discount factor yields:
b Σt = xλβb xt + λβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b Σt+1
´
• Taking diﬀerences and iterating forward yields
b Σt (r) − b Σt =( xλβ)(b xt (r) − b xt)
+(λβ)(xλβ)Et (b xt+1 (r) − b xt+1)
+(λβ)
2 (xλβ)Et (b xt+2 (r) − b xt+2)
+...
• Substituting the expressions for the future hiring rates and collecting terms:
b Σt (r) − b Σt = xΨ Σw(b wt − b w∗
t)
with
Ψ =
λ2β
1 − λ2β
38• Finally, we have
b χt (r)=b χt − (1 − χ)xΨ Σw(b wt − b w∗
t)
• Similarly, we have
Etb χt+1
¡
r0¢
= Etb χt+1 − (1 − χ)xΨ ΣwEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
A8e. Using the expected Nash condition at time t +1
• The expected Nash condition for ﬁrms renegotiating at time t +1is
Etχt+1
¡
r0¢
Jt+1
¡
r0¢
= Et
¡
1 − χt+1
¡
r0¢¢
Ht+1
¡
r0¢
• Loglinearizing
Et b Jt+1
¡
r0¢
+( 1− χ)
−1 Etb χt+1
¡
r0¢
= Et b Ht+1
¡
r0¢
• Substituting the expressions found in sections A8b, A8c and A8d and rearranging yields
Et b Ht+1 = Et b Jt+1 + ΓEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
+( 1− χ)
−1 Etb χt+1
with
Γ =( 1− ηxΨ)η−1 Σw
• Using the loglinear expression for the hiring rate averaged across all ﬁrms:
b xt = Et
³
b Jt+1 + b Λt,t+1
´
we ﬁnally obtain
Et
³
b Ht+1 + b Λt,t+1
´
= b xt + ΓEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
+( 1− χ)
−1 Etb χt+1
A9. Spillover eﬀects
• Consider the loglinear target wage
b wo
t (r)=
³
ϕfnb fnt + ϕxb xt (r)
´
+ ϕs
³
b st + b Ht+1 + b Λt,t+1
´
+ ϕχb χt (r)
39• Substituting the following expressions in the target wage:
Et
³
b Ht+1 + b Λt,t+1
´
= b xt + ΓEt
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
+( 1− χ)
−1 Etb χt+1
b xt (r)=b xt + λ Σw(b wt − b w∗
t)
b χt (r)=b χt − (1 − χ)xΨ Σw(b wt − b w∗
t)
we obtain
b wo
t (r)=b wo
t +
τ1
1 − ρλβ
Et
¡
b wt+1 − b w∗
t+1
¢
+
τ2
1 − ρλβ
(b wt − b w∗
t)
with
b wo
t = ϕfnb fnt +( ϕx + ϕs)b xt + ϕsb st + ϕχb χt +( 1− χ)
−1 ϕsEtb χt+1
and
τ1 = ϕsΓ(1 − ρλβ)
τ2 =
£
ϕxλ − ϕχ (1 − χ)xΨ
¤
 Σw(1 − ρλβ)
• Note that, given our calibration described in section 4, τ1 =0 .47 and τ2 =0 .015.
A10. Reservation wages at a ﬁrm that has not renegotiated for τ periods
A10a. Worker’s reservation wage, Rw
t (τ)
• Consider a ﬁrm and a worker at time t who have not renegotiated for τ periods.
• The worker reservation wage, denoted with Rw
t (τ), is the wage that makes the worker surplus
Ht (τ) equal to 0:
Ht (τ)=Rw
t (τ) − b + ρβEtΛt,t+1Ht+1 (τ) − stβEtΛt,t+1Hx,t+1 =0
• Using similar arguments as in section A8 of the appendix we can write
b Ht (τ)= b Ht +( 1− χ)χ−1 
³
Rw b Rw
t (τ) − wb wt
´
+ ρβEt
³
b Ht+1 (τ) − b Ht+1
´
=0
and
Et
³
b Ht+1 (τ) − b Ht+1
´
= −(1 − χ)χ−1 λ∆w(b wt − b w∗
t (τ))
where w∗
t (τ) is the wage that has been renegotiated in t − τ.
• Combining equations yields
b Ht (τ)= b Ht − (1 − χ)χ−1 ρβλ∆w(b wt − b w∗
t (τ)) + (1 − χ)χ−1 
³
Rw b Rw
t (τ) − wb wt
´
=0
which gives the following expression for the worker’s reservation wage:
Rw b Rw
t (τ)=w b wt + ρβλ∆w(b wt − b w∗
t (τ)) − χ(1 − χ)
−1  −1 b Ht
40• Rearranging:
Rw b Rw
t (τ)=w∆b wt − w(∆ − 1) b w∗
t (τ) − χ(1 − χ)
−1  −1 b Ht
A10b. Firm’s reservation wage, R
f
t (τ)
• The ﬁrm reservation wage, denoted with R
f
t (τ),i st h ew a g et h a tm a k e st h eﬁrm surplus Jt (τ)
equal to 0:
Jt (τ)=fnt +
κ
2
xt (τ)
2 − R
f
t (τ)+ρβEtΛt,t+1Jt+1 (τ)=0
• Using similar arguments as in sections A7 and A8 of the appendix we can write
b Jt (τ)= b Jt + xβ (b xt (τ) − b xt) − ε
³
Rf b R
f
t (τ) − w b wt
´
+ ρβEt
³
b Jt+1 (τ) − b Jt+1
´
=0
and
Et
³
b Jt+1 (τ) − b Jt+1
´
=( b xt (τ) − b xt)=λ Σw(b wt − b w∗
t (τ))
• Combining equations yields
b Jt (τ)= b Jt + βλ Σw(b wt − b w∗
t (τ)) − ε
³
Rf b R
f
t (τ) − w b wt
´
=0
which gives the following expression for the ﬁrm’s reservation wage:
Rf b R
f
t (τ)=wb wt + βλΣw(b wt − b w∗
t (τ)) +  −1 b Jt
• Rearranging:
Rf b R
f
t (τ)=wΣb wt − w(Σ − 1) b w∗
t (τ)+ −1 b Jt
41APPENDIX B
Steady state calculation
• Given the calibrated parameters and target values in Table 1, we obtain implied values of
n,u,x,χ,ls,I/y,ac/y and c/y from steady state calculations.
• First obtain
n =
s
1 − ρ + s
u =1− n
x =
su
n
and
χ =
η
η +( 1− η)Σ/∆
• Then get
z =1 /β − 1+δ
k
y
=
α
z
I
y
= δ
k
y
k =
µ
a
k
y
¶ 1
1−α
n
y = akαn1−α
ac =
κ
2
x2n
fn =( 1− α)a
µ
k
n
¶α
• Then κ and w solve the following system (equations (12) and (33))
(
κx = β
¡
fn − w + κ
2x2 + ρκx
¢
w = χ
¡
fn + κ
2x2 + sκx
¢
+( 1− χ)b
¡
fn + κ
2x2¢
where
b =
b
fn + κ
2x2
• The ﬂow value of unemployment is given by
b = b
³
fn +
κ
2
x2
´
42• The steady state labor share is calculated from
ls =
wn
y
= w
n
k
k
y
• Finally
c
y
=1−
I
y
−
κ
2
x2n
y
43APPENDIX C
The complete loglinear model
• Technology
b yt = b at + αb kt +( 1− α)b nt (E1)
• Resource constraint
b yt = cyb ct + iyb It +( 1− cy − iy)(2b xt + b nt) (E2)
where cy = c
y,i y= I
y and 1 − cy − iy = κ
2
x2n
y
• Matching
b mt = σb ut +( 1− σ)b vt (E3)
• Employment dynamics
b nt+1 = ρb nt +( 1− ρ) b mt (E4)
• Transition probabilities
b qt = b mt − b vt (E5)
b st = b mt − b ut (E6)
• Unemployment
b ut = −
n
u
b nt (E7)
• Capital dynamics
b kt+1 =( 1− δ)b kt + δb It (E8)
• Aggregate vacancies
b xt = b qt + b vt − b nt (E9)
• Consumption-saving
b λt = Etb λt+1 +
1/β − 1+δ
1/β
Etb zt+1 (E10)
• Marginal utility
b λt = −b ct (E11)
44• Aggregate hiring rate
b xt = Etb Λt,t+1 +  
³
fn b fnt+1 − wEt b wt+1
´
+ βEtb xt+1 (E12)
where
  = β (κx)
−1
• Marginal product of labor
b fnt = b yt − b nt (E13)
• Capital renting
b yt − b kt = b zt (E14)
• Weight in Nash bargaining
b χt = −(1 − χ)
³
b Σt − b ∆t
´
(E15)
with
b ∆t = ρλβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b ∆t+1
´
(E16)
b Σt = xλβb xt + λβEt
³
b Λt,t+1 + b Σt+1
´
(E17)
• Spillover-free target wage
b wo
t = ϕfnb fnt +( ϕx + ϕs)b xt + ϕsb st + ϕχb χt +( 1− χ)
−1 ϕsEtb χt+1 (E18)
where
ϕfn = χfnw−1 ϕx = χκx2w−1 ϕs = χsκxw−1 ϕχ = χ
£
fn +( κ/2)x2 − b − sβH
¤
w−1
• Aggregate wage
b wt = γb b wt−1 + γ b wo
t + γfEt b wt+1 (E19)
where
γb =( 1+τ2)φ−1 γ = ςφ−1 γf =( ρβ − τ1)φ−1
φ =1+τ2 + ς + ρβ − τ1 ς =( 1− λ)(1− ρλβ)λ−1
τ1 = ϕsΓ(1 − ρλβ)
τ2 =
£
ϕxλ − ϕχ (1 − χ)xΨ
¤
 Σw(1 − ρλβ)
Γ =( 1− xηΨ)η−1 Σw Ψ = βλ2/
¡
1 − βλ2¢
Σ =( 1− βλ)
−1
• Technology process
b at = ρab at−1 + εa
t (E20)
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Figure 2: Bargaining set for contracts still in place after the average duration (3Q)
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Figure 3: Bargaining set for contracts still in place after 40 months
firm reservation wage
actual wage
worker reservation wageCFS Working Paper Series: 
 
No.  Author(s)  Title 
2007/08  Olivier Blanchard 
Jordi Galí  A New Keynesian Model with Unemployment 
2007/07  Kai Christoffel 
Keith Kuester 
Tobias Linzert 
Identifying the Role of Labor Markets for 
Monetary Policy in an Estimated DSGE Model 
2007/06  Gauti B. Eggertsson 
Banjamin Pugsley 
The Mistake of 1937: A General Equilibrium 
Analysis 
 
2007/05  Michael Bordo 
Christopher Erceg 
Andrew Levin 
Ryan Michaels 
Three Great American Disinflations 
 
2007/04  Michael Sonnenholzner 
Achim Wambach 
On the Role of Patience in an Insurance Market 
with Asymmetric Information 
2007/03  Michael Binder 
Volker Wieland 
The European Central Bank 
2007/02  Francis X. Diebold 
Kamil Yilmaz 
 
Measuring Financial Asset Return and Volatility 
Spillovers, With Application to Global Equity 
Markets 
2007/01  Günter W. Beck 
Kirsten Hubrich 
Massimiliano Marcellino 
 
Regional Inflation Dynamics within and across 
Euro Area Countries and a Comparison with the 
US 
2006/35  Christopher D. Carroll 
Misuzu Otsuka 
Jirka Slacalek 
How Large Is the Housing Wealth Effect? A New 
Approach 
2006/34  Giuseppe Bertola 
Winfried Koeniger 
Consumption Smoothing and Income 
Redistribution 
 
Copies of working papers can be downloaded at http://www.ifk-cfs.de  